ABSTRACT Correlation and fusion of intrusion alerts to provide effective Situation Awareness of cyber-attacks has become an active area of research. Snort is the most widely deployed intrusion detection sensor. For many networks and their system administrators, the alerts generated by Snort are the primary indicators of network misuse and attacker activity. However, the volume ofthe alerts generated in typical networks makes real-time attack scenario comprehension difficult. In this paper, we present an attack-stage oriented classification of alerts using Snort as an example, and demonstrate that this effectively improves real-time Situation Awareness of multistage attacks. We also incorporate this scheme into a real-time attack detectionframework andprototype presented by the authors in previous work and provide some results from testing against multistage attack scenar- . The volume of alerts generated by Snort on a typical network is of the order of thousands a day. The alert messages that Snort generates are cryptic and often exploit-specific. Thus, it is difficult for an analyst to derive a high-level view of attacker activity and attack progression that can enable him to take timely actions. The need therefore, is this: An effective situation awareness mechanism that can quickly indicate major stages or broad outlines of an attack scenario and provide useful information for network defense. In this paper, we present an alert categorization model that quickly and effectively groups alerts in a live alert stream to indicate relevant stages of a multistage attack scenario. This provides the analyst with the necessary information to be able to take time-critical decisions without being overwhelmed by the volume of alerts. This alert categorization method is incorporated into the alert fusion system presented by the authors in [2] . We demonstrate the utility of the approach in enhancing the output of the fusion engine and in providing improved Situation Awareness by testing with actual multistage attack scenarios.
INTRODUCTION
Several schemes have been proposed for Intrusion Detection System (IDS) alert correlation including a framework for real-time attack scenario detection by *Research supported in part by Alion Science and Technology subcontract F30602-03-C-0245 from ARDA and AFRL programs the authors in [2] . The primary (and often, the only) source of alerts in most networks is the open source sensor Snort [11] . The volume of alerts generated by Snort on a typical network is of the order of thousands a day. The alert messages that Snort generates are cryptic and often exploit-specific. Thus, it is difficult for an analyst to derive a high-level view of attacker activity and attack progression that can enable him to take timely actions. The need therefore, is this: An effective situation awareness mechanism that can quickly indicate major stages or broad outlines of an attack scenario and provide useful information for network defense. In this paper, we present an alert categorization model that quickly and effectively groups alerts in a live alert stream to indicate relevant stages of a multistage attack scenario. This provides the analyst with the necessary information to be able to take time-critical decisions without being overwhelmed by the volume of alerts. This alert categorization method is incorporated into the alert fusion system presented by the authors in [2] . We demonstrate the utility of the approach in enhancing the output of the fusion engine and in providing improved Situation Awareness by testing with actual multistage attack scenarios.
The main contributions of this paper are:
clustering and categorization aimed at enhancing Situation Awareness of attack scenarios * Experimental results with multistage attacks that demonstrate the utility of our approach
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews related work, Section 3 presents our alert clustering or classification scheme and Section 4 presents experimental results. Section 5 relates our work to the military's Indications and Warning (I & W) framework and Section 6 concludes with some directions for future work.
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A detailed classification of Intrusion Detection Sensors is presented in [1] . Several schemes to classify computer attacks have also been proposed in the literature. In [5] , computer attacks are classified on the basis of the attack techniques such as masquerade and hardware misuse. Subsequently in [6] , the approach is extended to classify computer attacks based on multiple dimensions, such as both intrusion technique and intrusion result. In [3] , a detailed computer security incident taxonomy is presented. Here an effort is made to define what constitutes an event, an attack and an incident. Various aspects of a computer security incident such as possible attackers, attack tools, vulnerabilities, results and objectives are considered. A target-centric approach to classifying computer attacks is presented in [4] . Here a detailed ontology for intrusion detection is presented in which the target, means, consequences and location of an attack are considered and appropriate taxonomies are suggested for these. However, none of the above research efforts attempt to classify or relate intrusion events from the point of view of a multistage attack. (Some of the attack consequences that the above cited works define could however be used for this purpose). Situation Awareness of an evolving multistage cyber-attack is required for accurate Indications and Warning as defined by the military and intelligence communities ( [7] , [8] ). This requires an analyst to be able to classify and relate individual attacks based on their role in reconnaissance, intrusion, escalation of privileges and finally, goal(s) that may be driving the attacker and his actions. Another fact is that although most other efforts introduce taxonomies, they fail to apply this scheme to actual intrusion alerts from specific sensors. Thus, previous efforts, though useful, are deficient when dealing with actual IDS alerts. The view that taxonomies (and thus the individual classes that they consist of) should be mutually exclusive ( [9] , [6] ) and unambiguous is not supported when one examines alerts that are generated by real sensors, say Snort. As an example, consider Snort alert NETBIOS SMB-DS DCERPC Remote Activation bind attempt with Snort ID 2252. The result of this attack is either a Denial-of-Service or Unauthorized remote administrative access. These two results mean different things to the analyst trying to detect a coordinated attack against a high-value target network. Actual detection of what the attacker intends in this case is possible only by correlating this event with others. It must also be noted that Snort provides its own high-level classification of alerts in the form of rules files (e.g. web-attacks.rules, ftp.rules), but these only indicate the general category of the attack and not what the attacker achieves or the logical progression of a goal-oriented attack.
ALERT CLASSIFICATION SCHEME Our alert classification scheme is designed to categorize intrusion detection sensor alerts into groups that most effectively indicate their stage in a multistage attack (Thus, this is different from the term clustering as used in Computer Science with respect to algorithms such as K-Means clustering). Effective situation awareness of cyber-attacks requires fusion of alerts from both host and network IDSs. Our scheme describes classes into which alerts can be mapped, using Snort alerts as clarifying examples (other sensor alerts could be similarly mapped). An alert can be part of multiple classes. Each class has a two part name -the first indicates the general category (e.g., Reconnaissance, Intrusion, Privilege Escalation and Goal), and the second indicates a specific sub-category. Alert descriptions are taken from the Snort signature database. Table 1 summarizes the classification scheme. Additional miscellaneous categories are introduced for alerts that may not indicate a specific attack stage, but are more general malicious software such as trojans and viruses. 
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION OVERVIEW OF FUSION FRAMEWORK
Here we present an overview of the alert fusion framework into which we deploy the alert classification system presented here. A detailed description is available in [2] . We define hierarchical templates for multi-stage goal-oriented attacks called Scenario Graphs. IDS alerts form the atomic level (Attribute Node), exploits comprising of alerts form intermediate levels (Attack Node), and entire attack scenarios consisting of exploits form the top-level of these templates (Scenario Graph). Alerts arriving in an alert stream are matched with elements of these templates to provide inferences of attack scenario development. Figure 1 depicts the hierarchical structure of this model. Attribute Node: An Attribute Node represents an event (usually an IDS alert) in our framework. This event is represented as a collection of Attribute Fields, which are elements (tags) in the newly emerging Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF [12] ) format. Some of the Attribute Fields are designated as Critical Fields. An alert in the alert stream triggers an Attribute Node in a template if its Critical Field values match those defined for the latter. An Attribute Node that is triggered has its Credibility Value changed dynamically from 0 to 1 and contributes an a priori determined weight to its parent Attack Node(s).
Attack Node: An Attack Node is an exploit that is represented in terms of its components (child nodes), which may be Attribute Nodes or other Attack Nodes. An Attack Node has a correlation function that defines how the weights of its child nodes (which are triggered at a point in time) are correlated to calculate its own Attack Node Credibility Value. Attack Nodes are members of higher level Scenario Graphs and contribute their credibility values to them in a dynamic process.
Scenario Graph: This is a template of a multistage attack scenario which has several attack stages. These stages may typically be exploits. We view each such stage as a node (Attack Node) of the Scenario Graph. The Scenario Graphs are goal oriented, with at least one node of a Scenario Graph being identified as a goal node. A Scenario Graph also has a Scenario Credibility Value (zero, initially), that varies dynamically as fusion of the live intrusion alert stream proceeds. A Scenario Graph developed based on this framework is thus a complete representation of an attack scenario with its constituent exploits and intrusion alerts that indicate these exploits and incorporates the various relationships that exist between these elements.
Thus in real-time, one obtains dynamically varying credibilities of goal-oriented attacks based on the state of a live intrusion alert stream. This provides the necessary Situation Awareness to the security analyst. 
EXPERIMENTS
We performed some experiments using the fusion framework and alert clustering scheme presented earlier. The network under consideration was complex and consisted of multiple subnets and hundreds of machines designed to simulate an actual military network. The experimental data consisted both of unlabeled data corresponding to multistage attacks against high-value targets in the network, and ground truth data which was used to verify if the detection process was successful or not.
The steps taken were as follows:
* Attribute templates (Alert data, primarily Snort alerts, numbering in the thousands) corresponding to the attacks were passed through the fusion engine. We have also shown some examples of Snort alert classifications based on this scheme and have demonstrated experimentally how this provides enhanced Situation Awareness. We have described how this fits into the Indications & Warning framework advocated by the military. Future work involves the mapping of sensor alerts from other IDS sensors into this scheme and the development of a fully functional and robust Situation Awareness tool. We also plan to carry out further experiments and present concrete metrics which would better quantify the usefulness of our approach. The incorporation of network details with minimum user configuration is seen as an important challenge.
